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We consider a one period version of our model of ﬁnancial contracting in which we
allow for stochastic monitoring. We characterize the eﬃcient contract and show that it
shares many similar features to the characterization with deterministic monitoring in Cole
and Atkeson (1). Because of the nature of the court-based enforcement system, we then add
the additional requirement that the monitoring decision be self-enforcing. We show that with
self-enforcement, it becomes optimal to separate the debt and equity contracts into separate
construct with diﬀerent holders of these claims. We show that the eﬃcient contract with
commitment and stochastic monitoring is not self-enforcing, while the eﬃcient contract with
deterministic monitoring can be if the expect payment to debt holders is large enough to cover
their monitoring costs. Finally, we provide a partial characterization the eﬃcient contract
with self-enforcing monitoring.
The self-enforcing condition is an incentive condition on the principal, and implies that
the revelation principal does not hold. In fact, we show that the minimally revealing message
space - given the outcome being support - is eﬃcient. Moreover, this message space must
involve a nondegenerate partition of the type space for this message space to be admissible in
the sense of having the possibility of satisfying the self-enforcing condition. We characterize
∗Atkeson and Cole gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation.the eﬃcient contract for any admissible partition of the type space. We also show by numerical
example that the partition of the state space under self-enforcement may not be minimal.
That is, it may be eﬃcient to increase the size of partition beyond that which is necessary
for admissibility.
1. Model
There is a collection of risk neutral outside investors who are endowed with a pro-
duction technology that transforms the labor of a manager into output. There are a large
number of identical risk averse managers. These managers have an outside opportunity that
oﬀers them utility U0.
The production process takes place over the course of three sub-periods within the
period. In the ﬁrst sub-period, a manager is chosen to operate the production technology.
In the second sub-period, this production technology yields output y = θ, where θ is a pro-
ductivity shock that is idiosyncratic to this technology. In this sub-period, this productivity
shock θ and hence, output as well, is private information to the manager. The set of possible
shocks is an interval given by Θ and the distribution of these shocks has c.d.f. P with density
p and an expected value of one.
In the second sub-period, a payment can be made out of the output of the ﬁrm to
the outside investors. The outside investors have the option of monitoring the output of the
project to learn the realization of the shock θ in order to condition the payment on the level
of output rather than on level of output reported by the manager. This monitoring comes
at the cost of γ units of output. At the end of the second sub-period, the manager has the
option of spending on perquisites that he alone enjoys up to fraction τ of whatever output
of the ﬁrm that he has not paid out to the outside investors during this sub-period. The
output that the manager does not spend on perquisites is productively reinvested in the ﬁrm.
For simplicity, we assume that the gross return on this productive reinvestment in the ﬁrm
between the second and third sub-periods is one.1
1An alternative interpretation is that the manager has become essential to maintaining the value of the
residual output in the third sub-period. Without his cooperation the value of this output is reduced by the
factor (1 − τ) and that based upon this, the manager can, in the third subperiod, renegociate his contract.
For simplicity, we assume that the manager has all the bargaining power in this renegociation, and hence he
is able to demand that the fraction τ of the residual output be given to him.
1In the third sub-period, the outside investors can freely observe both the output of
the ﬁrm θ and the division of this output between spending on perks for the manager and
productive reinvestment.
The contracting problem between the outside investors and the manager can be de-
scribed as follows. A contract between these parties speciﬁes a probability of monitoring
by the outside investors m and a payment from the manager to the outside investors in the
second sub-period v, and a payment from the outside investors to the manager in the third
sub-period. Both the payment to the investors in the second sub-period and the payment
to the manager in the third sub-period are conditioned upon whether monitoring has taken
place. We denote these payments by v0 and x0 if monitoring doesn’t take place and by v1
and x1 if it does.
We assume that the monitoring probability is a function of the manager’s announce-
ment ˆ θ of the output of the project in the second sub-period, and denote it by m(ˆ θ).I n i t i a l l y ,
we assume that the outside investors can commit to a probabilistic strategy for paying the cost
to monitor the output of the project in the second sub-period as a function of the manager’s
announcement. Later we will relax this assumption.
The payments v from the manager to the outside investors in the second sub-period
are contingent on the manager’s announcement of the productivity shock ˆ θ as well as the
outcome of the monitoring decision. Let v0(ˆ θ) denote the payment that the manager makes
to the outside investors in the second sub-period as a function of the announcement ˆ θ in case
monitoring does not take place, and let v1(ˆ θ,θ) denote the payment that the manager makes
as a function both of the announcement ˆ θ and the true value of θ in case monitoring does
take place. Finally, let xi(ˆ θ,θ) denote the payment from the outside investors to the manager
in the third sub-period as a function of his report ˆ θ in the second sub-period and the realized
production shock θ, where i =0denotes the case in which monitoring did not take place and
i = 1 denotes that in which it did.
For reasons of limited liability, we require
(1) v0(ˆ θ) ≤ ˆ θ,v 1(ˆ θ,θ) ≤ θ, and xi(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ 0.
2We assume, without loss of generality, that xi(ˆ θ,θ) is chosen to ensure that the manager
chooses not to take any perks for himself. This assumption implies a constraint on x0(ˆ θ,θ)
and x1(ˆ θ,θ) that
u(x0(ˆ θ,θ)) ≥ u(τ(θ − v0(ˆ θ))) for all ˆ θ,θ (2)
u(x1(ˆ θ,θ)) ≥ u(τ(θ − v1(ˆ θ,θ))) for all ˆ θ,θ.
Given the terms of the contract, m, v0,v 1,x 0, and x1 the manager chooses a strategy
for reporting θ denoted σ(θ). We say that the report σ(θ)=ˆ θ is feasible given v0 and θ if
v0(ˆ θ) ≤ θ. Note that this deﬁnition requires that the manager has the resources to make
the payment v0(σ(θ)) in the event that he reports σ(θ)=ˆ θ. We require the manager to
choose a reporting strategies such that σ(θ) is feasible given v0 for all θ. We interpret this
constraint as following from the assumption that there is an optimal contract in which the
outside investors choose to monitor if the manager announces ˆ θ but then does not pay v0(ˆ θ)
and that x(ˆ θ,θ)=0in this event.
We restrict attention to contracts in which the manager truthfully reports θ. Hence,
we impose the incentive constraint
m(θ)u(x1(θ,θ)) + (1 − m(θ))u(x0(θ,θ)) ≥ m(ˆ θ)u(x1(ˆ θ,θ)) + (1 − m(ˆ θ))u(x0(ˆ θ,θ)) (3)
for all θ ∈ Θ and feasible ˆ θ given θ and v0.
The managers payoﬀ under the contract is given by the expectation of u(xi(θ,θ)). Since




[m(θ)u(x1(θ,θ)) + (1 − m(θ))u(x0(θ,θ))]p(θ)dθ ≥ U0.
32. Characterizing an eﬃcient contract
We characterize a contract that maximizes the expected payoﬀ to the outside investors
(5)
Z
[θ − γm(θ) − m(θ)x1(θ,θ) − (1 − m(θ))x0(θ,θ)]p(θ)dθ
subject to the constraints (1), (2), (3), (4) and
(6) m(θ) ∈ [0,1] for all θ ∈ Θ,
in the following propositions. We refer to such a contract as an eﬃcient contract.
Proposition 1. There is an eﬃcient contract with the following properties: (i) v1(ˆ θ,θ)=θ
and v0(ˆ θ)=ˆ θ, (ii) x1(ˆ θ,θ)=0and x0(ˆ θ,θ)=τ(θ−ˆ θ) for θ 6= ˆ θ, and (iii) x0(θ,θ)=x1(θ,θ).
Proof: To prove part (i), note that v1 and v0 only show up in the no-perks constraint (2), and
that increasing their values to the maximum extent allowed by the limited liability constraint
(1) relaxes the no-perks constraint. Hence, it is eﬃcient to do so. Given (i) and the fact
that it is eﬃcient to punish misreporting to the maximum feasible extent, since it will not
occur in equilibrium, (ii) follows. Given (i), it follows that under truthtelling the no-perks
constraints cannot bind, and hence, ﬁxing the expected utility provided to the manager in
state θ at y(θ), where
y(θ)=m(θ)u(x1(θ,θ)) + (1 − m(θ))u(x0(θ,θ)),
it follows that any eﬃcient contract must minimize the cost of delivering this utility. In other
words, it must solve the following sub-problem
min
x0,x1
m(θ)x1 +( 1 − m(θ))x0 s.t.m (θ)u(x1)+( 1 − m(θ))u(x0) ≥ y(θ).
The concavity of u implies that this minimization is achieved with x1 = x0. Q.E.D.















θ − ˜ θ
i´
,
w h e r ew en o wu s ew(θ) to denote x(θ,θ).
Proposition 2. In any solution to the simpliﬁed problem:
(i) w(θ) is such that there exists a ¯ θ such that w(θ)=¯ w for all θ ≤ ¯ θ, and strictly
increasing thereafter,
(ii) m(θ) is weakly decreasing.
If θ has ﬁnite upper support and if ¯ w is strictly greater than 0, then
(iii) m(θ) < 1 and is strictly decreasing in the interior, and
(iv) there will exist a cutoﬀ ˆ θ < sup(Θ) such that m(θ)=0for all θ > ˆ θ.
Proof: We ﬁrst form the Lagrangian, which we formulate in terms of choosing the monitoring
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+χ+(θ)(1 − m(θ)) + χ−(θ)m(θ))
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p(θ)dθ,
where C(x)=u−1(x), λ is the multiplier on the promise keeping constraint and δ(θ,˜ θ) is the
multiplier on the incentive constraint (9) with respect to the deviation of reporting ˜ θ given a
realization θ. The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
(11) C
0(y(θ)) = λ +
Z θ
0











Condition (11) implies that if constraint (9) doesn’t bind, then y(θ)=¯ u, and moreover that
y(θ) ≥ ¯ u for all θ. In terms of the compensation of the manager, this implies that w(θ)= ¯ w
when the incentive constraint doesn’t bind, where ¯ w = C(¯ u). To see that if the constraint
binds at θ1 and if θ2 > θ1, then it binds at θ2, and moreover that w(θ1) <w (θ2), note that
(1−m(˜ θ))u(τ
h
θ − ˜ θ)
i
) is strictly increasing in θ, which implies that y(θ2) >y (θ1), and hence
w(θ2)=C(u(θ2) >C(θ1)=w(θ1)
which this proves (i).
To prove (ii), note that condition (12) implies that if m(θ) > 0, then it must be the
case that δ(˜ θ,θ) > 0 for some ˜ θ > θ, or in other words that deviating and reporting θ binds
on some type ˜ θ. This result implies that if we take y(θ) as given, and deﬁne for each θ the












if ˜ θ < θ
0 o.w.
,
then, eﬃciency implies that m(θ)=s u p ˜ θ{π
˜ θ(θ)}. In other words, the probability of monitor-
ing is positive only if it binds for some type. (Note that by ﬁlling in the required probabilities
with zeros we removed the need to shrink the type space that could deviate to θ as θ in-
creased.) The function πθ(˜ θ) is weakly decreasing in θ for ﬁxed ˜ θ, and the sup over a set of
weakly decreasing functions is weakly decreasing.
We turn now to the case in which θ has ﬁnite upper support. To prove (iii), note ﬁrst




θ − ˜ θ
i´
≤ (1−m(θ))u(τ(sup(θ)),
and that since u(τ(sup(θ)) is ﬁnite, the rhs goes to zero as m(θ) goes to one. Hence, m(θ) < 1
for all θ.
To prove that m is strictly decreasing in the interior when θ has ﬁnite upper support,
assume that the reverse was true. That is, assume that for θ ∈ [θ1,θ2],m (θ)=a, where
60 <a<1 and θ2 − θ1 > 0. Then, note that since for all ﬁnite θ > θ1,
(1 − a)u(τ [θ − θ1)]) > (1 − a)u(τ [θ − min(θ2,θ))]),
this contracts our earlier result that monitoring is only positive if it binds for some type.
To prove (iv), note that the incentive constraint (9) implies that if ¯ w>τ(θ−ˆ θ), then
deviating and making a report of ˆ θ can only lower the payoﬀ of the manager. Hence, for all
θ such that τ(sup(Θ) − θ) < ¯ w, monitoring is unnecessary and will optimally be set to zero.
Note that since w(θ) ≥ ¯ w, the interval over which m(θ)=0 , may be substantially larger than
this simple bound would imply. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3. Since monitoring goes to zero above some cutoﬀ ˆ θ; i.e. m(θ)=0for all
θ > ˆ θ; it is eﬃcient for v0(θ)=ˆ θ for all θ > ˆ θ.
























θ − ˜ θ
i´
,
and hence there is no further relaxation in the incentive constraint from higher payments in
the second sub-period above the level of the monitoring threshold. Q.E.D.
As the gap between proposition 2 and proposition 3. makes clear, the exact form of
v0(θ) is only pinned down for θ such that m(θ) > 0, and either of the two extremes indicated
under proposition 2 or proposition 3. is eﬃcient. This is because monitoring at a given
θ is done to dissuade misreporting by managers with higher realizations of the shock. If
monitoring ceases, above some threshold ˆ θ,t h e ni ti se ﬃcient to have the payments in the
second sub-period take on a debt like structure in which up to the threshold the manager
pays out everything, and above ˆ θ he pays out the ﬂat amount θ
∗. However, for θ such that
positive monitoring takes place, then setting v0(θ)=θ is necessary for eﬃciency for those
realizations the no-perks constraint binds, and raising the second sub-period payment strictly
r e l a x e st h i sc o n s t r a i n t .H e n c e ,i tm u s tb es e ta sh i g ha sp o s s i b l ef o re ﬃciency.
7A. Contrasting Stochastic and Deterministic Monitoring
Here, we restrict ourselves to deterministic monitoring in order to exhibit the close
connection between the two. Formally, we impose the restriction that m(θ) ∈ {0,1}. Now
v0(ˆ θ) is vacuous when m(ˆ θ)=1 and v1(ˆ θ,θ) is vacuous in the reverse case when m(ˆ θ)=0 .
However, none of the results in proposition 1 depended on monitoring not being stochastic.
So that characterization still holds. Moreover, the logic of propositions 2 and 3 carries over
with this restriction on m(θ). We summarize these results in the following preposition. First
through, a bit of useful notation. Let M denote the set of reports which induce monitoring;
where M = {θ : m(θ)=1}; and let θ
∗ denote the lower support of the set of reports that
don’t induce monitoring; where θ
∗ =i n f {θ : θ / ∈ M}.
Proposition 4. There is an eﬃcient contract with the following properties: (i) v1(ˆ θ,θ)=θ
for all ˆ θ s.t. m(ˆ θ)=1 and v0(ˆ θ)=θ
∗ for all ˆ θ / ∈ M, where θ
∗ =i n f
n
ˆ θ|ˆ θ / ∈ M
o
, (ii) M is
an interval ranging from 0 to θ
∗, and (iii) the payments to the manager w(θ) have the form
w(θ)= ¯ w for θ ≤ ¯ θ and w(θ)=τ(θ−θ
∗) for θ > ¯ θ, where ¯ θ is the solution to ¯ w = τ
¡¯ θ − θ
∗¢
.
Proof: See Atkeson and Cole (1).
Thus the results with stochastic and deterministic monitoring are very similar. More-
over, the result that the stochastic monitoring schedule is strictly decreasing for all nonzero
monitoring levels becomes, under deterministic monitoring the result that the monitoring is
weakly decreasing, which implies that it is done on the an interval of shock reports starting
from the lowest level. With respect to compensation, the results are somewhat more stark
with deterministic monitoring. The eﬃcient contract is completely speciﬁe db yt h eb a s ep a y
of the manager, ¯ w and the upper support of the monitoring set θ
∗. Monitoring takes place for
any report ˆ θ < θ
∗, and when monitoring takes place the outside investors take everything. In
the case of a report that doesn’t lead to monitoring, θ ≥ θ
∗, the second sub-period payment
is θ
∗. The compensation of the manager is the max[ ¯ w,τ(θ − θ
∗)] so long as he tells the truth,
and the minimum possible if he doesn’t.
3. Self-Enforcing Monitoring
Court systems require that one of the parties to an agreement bring a complaint before
they will consider enforcing it. This fact has been seen as suggesting that a natural condition
8to require of our eﬃcient contract is that the outside investors making the monitoring decision
have a positive motivation to undertake it. For monitoring to be self-enforcing, the gap in
the expected net payments for monitoring v.s. not monitoring must be weakly greater than
the cost γ for any reports that lead to monitoring, and strictly equal to γ if monitoring is
occurring with a probability between 0 and 1.
This requirement is in eﬀect an incentive constraint on the principals to the contract
(in this case, the outside investors). The addition of this incentive constraint and the re-
sulting lack of complete enforcement means that we can no longer appeal to the revelation
principal to determine the nature of the message space in the contract. In particular, the
truth-telling equilibrium of a direct mechanism has the potential of giving the principals too
much information which can make satisfying their incentive constraint with respect to their
monitoring decision diﬃcult.
Consider an arbitrary message space denoted by Ω. Given this message space, we can




1(ω,θ), along with a reporting
strategy σω : Θ → Ω. The analog to our conditions under commitment are given by the
following constraints:
The feasibility conditions for the ω-contract are
v
ω







i (ω,θ) ≥ 0















1(ˆ ω,θ)) + (1 − m
ω(ˆ ω))u(x
ω
0(ˆ ω)) ∀ˆ ω ∈ Ω & θ ∈ Θ.
The no-perks constraint for the ω-contract is given by
u(x
ω
i (ω,θ)) ≥ u(τ(θ − vi(ω,θ))).












We turn next to formalizing our the self-enforcing condition for the monitors. To
make monitoring self-enforcing, it is necessary that the net expected payment be equal to
zero if m(θ) ∈ (0,1), nonnegative if m(θ)=1 and nonpositive if m(θ)=0 . However, the
net expected gain depends upon how the claims to output are distributed among the outside
investors and the mechanism that initiates monitoring.
With respect to the distribution of claims, it matters whether or not the second sub-
period and the third sub-period claims can be thought of as being held by one joint investor,
or whether or not there are two separate investors holding each of these claims (and of course
all the convex combinations in between).
To make this point, it will be convenient to deﬁne the expected payment conditional










Next consider the net payout in two extreme cases in which (i) an investor held all of
the claims and (ii) one investor held the claims to second sub-period payouts and a second
investor held the claims to third sub-period payouts:
1. Unseparated Claims Condition: The expected gain to the monitors is
[˜ v
ω
1(ˆ ω) − v
ω
0(ˆ ω)]τ − γ,
since the agency cost will lose them at most only the fraction τ of what is not paid out
in the second sub-period
2. Separated Claims Condition: The expected gain to the monitors is
[˜ v
ω
1(ˆ ω) − v
ω
0(ˆ ω)] − γ,
10since now the holders to the claim on the second sub-period payment will lose the full
amount of anything them don’t collect in this period. Hence, separated claims imply a
larger gap in the expected net payments for a given gap between vω
1(ˆ ω) and vω
0(ˆ ω).
The actual extent of the separation of the claims need to induce the right incentives
depends upon how monitoring decision is made. For example, if all of the holders of second
sub-period claims had to agree to monitoring, then we would need complete separation. If
only a majority of the holders had to want it, then we would need that a majority of the
second sub-period claims were held by investors who didn’t also hold claims to the third sub-
period. If only a single debt holder could trigger monitoring, then we would need that only
a small portion of the claims were held by an outside investor who didn’t also hold claims to
the third period payments.
Deﬁnition: We therefore deﬁne an ω-contract to self-enforcing if there exists a
φ ∈ [γ,γ/τ] such that for all ω ∈ Ω, the expected diﬀerential between monitoring and
not monitoring is equal to φ if the monitoring probability is interior, and greater than equal
to φ if it is occurring with probability one. Formally, this is the requirement that for all
ˆ ω ∈ Ω,
[˜ v
ω
1(ˆ ω) − v
ω
0(ˆ ω)] = φ if 0 <m (ˆ ω) < 1,
[˜ v
ω
1(ˆ ω) − v
ω
0(ˆ ω)] ≥ φ if m(ˆ ω)=1,
[˜ v
ω
1(ˆ ω) − v
ω
0(ˆ ω)] ≤ φ if m(ˆ ω)=0 (14)
This deﬁnition imposes the weakest form of a self-enforcement constraint on the ω-
contract. It merely requires that the contract be such that there exists degree of separation
(and a voting rule for initiating monitoring) which will enable the contract to be self-enforcing.
One of the impacts of this constraint will be to force similar ω reports for some θ values in
order to satisfy this constraint. This will lead to the original direct optimal contract not being
able to satisfy the monitoring self-enforcing condition. For example, if there was a distinct
report ˆ ω for any θ < γ, then it would not be possible to satisfy this constraint and have a
positive probability of monitoring.
11B. Reconsidering our commitment solutions
Here we examine whether or not the analogs to the solutions with commitment with
either stochastic or deterministic monitoring can satisfy the monitoring self-enforcement con-
dition. We will show that trivially the stochastic monitoring solution cannot. However, we
will show that for the case of deterministic monitoring, if the amount being paid out on
the debt claim (which pays oﬀ in the second sub-period) is suﬃcient large, then the eﬃ-
cient contract with deterministic monitoring is self-enforcing. This result both provides a
partial rationalization for deterministic monitoring and gives further insight into how the
self-enforcing constraint is altering the eﬃcient contract.
The commitment contract with stochastic monitoring violates the self-enforcement
condition at every point at which monitoring is strictly interior. To see this note that if an
ω-contract is to replicate the outcomes of the eﬃcient contract with stochastic monitoring
and commitment, it must be the case that (i) mω(σω(θ)) = m(θ), (ii) vω
1(σω(θ),θ)=v1(θ,θ)
and (iii) vω
0(σω(θ)) = v0(θ). But, we have already shown that if m(θ) is strictly interior at
θ, this implies that it is also is strictly decreasing at θ from proposition 2, which implies
that m(θ) is invertible at this value of θ. Since the monitors must know the probability with
which they are suppose to monitor, this implies that they will also be able to infer that the








0)=E{v1(θ) − v0(θ)} =0 .
Given that our earlier result that m(θ) being positive implies that (9) binds, this then leads to
our result since there is no slack within which to adjust v1 and v0 to achieve self-enforcement.
T os e et h i sn o t et h a ts i n c ev1(θ)=v0(θ)=θ, we cannot raise v1(θ) without violating feasi-
bility. But we cannot we lower v0(θ) without violating (9), since this constraint binds.
The invertibility of the commitment stochastic monitoring schedule whenever it was
interior was a key factor in precluding a self-enforcing ω-contract analog. However, the
deterministic contract imposes a two part partition of the state space, which avoids the
invertibility problem for the ω-contract analog. Hence, the only factor in whether or not it
12is self-enforcing is whether the expected payment under monitoring is suﬃcient to cover the
costs of monitoring.
Proposition 5. If an eﬃcient contract with deterministic monitoring satisﬁes
E {θ|θ ≤ θ
∗} > γ,
then monitoring in the associated ω-contract is self-enforcing.











































x1(θ,θ)i fθ ∈ σω−1
(ω)
0o .w.
By construction, the payoﬀs to the principals and the manager are the same since xω
i is the
same as xi for each θ if the manager reports according to σω in the ω-contracting game
and tells the truth under the direct mechanism in the commitment case. Similar logic also
implies the no-perks constraint given that the strategies are followed. With respect to the
case when an agent misreports, the only relevant misreport is to say ω =0when θ > θ
∗ in
the ω-contracting game, and report some θ < θ
∗ in the direct mechanism. In both cases the
payment conditional on not monitoring is 0, and hence the ω-contracts no-perks constraint is
implied by that under the direct mechanism. Similar logic show that the incentive constraint
13under the ω-contract is implied by that under the direct mechanism. Hence, all that remains





0(0)|ω =0 } = E{θ|θ ≤ θ






0(1)|ω = 1} >E {θ|θ > θ
∗} − (θ
∗ − γ) > γ
and, hence our self-enforcing condition is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
C. An Eﬃcient Message Space
Here we prove that a message space consisting of monitoring probabilities, which we
denote by π, and no-monitoring payments, which we denote by v0, is suﬃcient to replicate
the outcomes of any other mechanism with an alternative message space. One thing to note
here is that this message space the least revealing possible given the activities of the monitors
that are being supported. The monitors must know with which probability they are suppose
to monitor, and they must also know whether or not the appropraite payment in the case of
nonmonitoring has been made, because otherwise they could not credibly threaten to monitor
and take everything if this payment wasn’t made. Hence, at a minimum, both π and v0 must
be conveyed to them. This is the opposite of the standard revelation principal in which the
message space is the space of the agent’s information, Θ, which is the most revealing possible.
Let Λ = m(Ω) × vω




















ˆ ω : m
ω(ˆ ω)=π and v
ω
0(ˆ ω)=v0.
Proposition 6. The λ-contract deliverers the same payoﬀsa st h eω-contract, and if the
ω-contract satisﬁes our constraints, then so too does the λ-contract.
Proof: The payoﬀ part follows trivially. With respect to the constraints, the feasibility,
no-perks, and promise-keeping constraints also follows trivially. Hence, all that needs to be
checked is the incentive constraints on the manager and the monitors.
To see that the analog incentive constraint on the manager holds for the λ-contract,
assume otherwise. That is, for some θ there exists an (π0,v0


























































Hence, this cannot be the case.
Next consider the incentive constraint for the monitors and assume that it does not
hold with respect to the λ-contract, despite holding for the original ω-contract. We start ﬁrst
with the case in which the monitoring probability is interior, and assume that there exists a


























ω∈ˆ Ω E {vω
1(ω,θ)|ω}Pr{θ : σω(θ)=ω}
P
ω∈ˆ Ω Pr{θ : σω(θ)=ω}
,
where






0(ω)=φ from the monitoring incentive constraint on the ω-contract,
which generates a contradiction. Q.E.D.
D. Eﬃciency and Partitions
The message space along with the reporting strategy partition the type space. Here
we start with a given partition of the type space and, taking the separation parameter φ in
the monitoring self-enforcement condition as given, characterize the eﬃcient contract.
Let {Θ1,Θ2,...} denote such a partition. For it to be physically feasible to satisfy the
monitoring condition, it must be the case that
E{θ|Θi} ≥ γ for all i.
Given a physically feasible partition, and our results with respect to the eﬃcient message
space, we can formulate the contracting problem as choosing [πi,v 0i]i=1,...,n and functions












[πiu(x1(θ)) + (1 − πi)u(x0(θ))]p(θ)dθ ≥ U
16πiu(x1(θ)) + (1 − πi)u(x0(θ)) ≥ (1 − πj)u(τ(θ − v0j))
for each θ, and each j 6= i
x0(θ) ≥ τ(θ − v0i)f o re a c hθ
x1(θ) ≥ τ(θ − v1(θ)) for each θ
v0i ≤ inf{θ ∈ Θi} for i = 1,...,n
v1(θ) ≤ θ for each θ
Z




≥ 0i fπi = 1
=0i fπi ∈ (0,1)
≤ 0i fπi =0
for i = 1,...,n.
Proposition 7. It is eﬃcient to set v0i =m i n [ E{θ|θ ∈ Θi} − φ,min(θ ∈ Θi)]. Addition-
ally, if v0i < min(θ ∈ Θi), then it is eﬃcient to set v1(θ)=θ for all θ ∈ Θi.
Proof: The logic here is largely in the case with commitment. The only caveat now is the
incentive constraint for monitoring. However, if both v0i and v1(θ) can be raised without vio-
lating the upper bound constraints on v0i and v1 or the incentive constraint for the monitors,
then it is always eﬃcient to do so. If E{θ|θ ∈ Θi} − φ < min(θ ∈ Θi), then it is possible
to raise v0i to E{θ|θ ∈ Θi} − φ and set v1(θ)=θ. Moreover, it is not possible to set these
variables any higher. If the reverse is true, then is always possible to raise v0i to min(θ ∈ Θi)
without violating the incentive constraint for monitoring by also raising some of those v1(θ)
who were below their upper bound of θ. Q.E.D.
Taking v0i as set according to the above proposition, we can form the Lagrangian for
17this problem as

























 πiu(x1(θ)) + (1 − πi)u(x0(θ))
































where λ is the multiplier on the promise-keeping condition, δ(θ,j)p(θ) is the multiplier on the
incentive constraint for the manager who has income θ and is considering report j, γ0(θ)p(θ)
and γ1(θ)p(θ) are the multipliers on the no-perks constraints on x0(θ) and x1(θ) respectively,
φ1(θ)p(θ) are the multipliers on the physical upper bounds on v1(θ),a n dψi Pr{Θi} is the
multiplier on the incentive constraint with respect to monitoring.

















































v1 :0=[ γ1(θ) − φ1(θ)+ψi]p(θ)dθ
These conditions are the analogs of what we saw with respect to the commitment case.
If none of the incentive, and no-perks constraints bind, then once again it is easy to see that
there is an eﬃcient level of consumption for the manager which is constant.
Denote this level of consumption by ¯ x, where λu0(¯ x)=1. Even when the incentive
constraints on the manager, bind, thereby inducing a higher level of consumption for that θ,
so long as the v1(θ) and v0i can be set high enough so that the no-perks constraints don’t
bind, then γ1(θ)=γ0(θ)=0 , and it is straightforward from the ﬁrst-order conditions to see
that x0(θ)=x1(θ). However, to the extent that the introduction of the incentive constraint
on monitoring and the resultant use of partitions precludes setting v1(θ) and v0i high enough
to prevent the no-perks constraints from binding, there is an additional factor that can raise
consumption above the eﬃcient level, ¯ x.
The incentive constraint on monitoring can bind from either of two directions, and
there are three cases correspondingly. Case 1: If ψi > 0, then φ1(θ) > 0 and v1(θ) must
be at the upper bound for all θ ∈ Θi. In this case the no-perks constraint on x1(θ) cannot
bind and γ1(θ)=0 .C a s e2 :I fψi < 0, then γ1(θ) must be positive and hence the no-perks
constraint constraint on x1(θ) must bind, which implies that v1(θ) < θ. Case 3: ψi =0 , and
the incentive constraint on monitoring doesn’t bind. However, as the following proposition
makes clear, Case 2 in which ψi < 0 is caused by having too coarse a partition, and will not
arise with an eﬃcient partition.
Proposition 8. If in the solution for a given partition, there exists an i such that, E{θ|θ ∈
Θi} − φ > min(θ ∈ Θi) and πi > 0, then there is an eﬃciency improving sub-division of this
element of the partition. Additionally, it is eﬃcient to make φ as small as possible, which is
γ.
Proof: To prove the ﬁrst statement, assume that this was the case, and consider the following
two cases. Case 1: There is a subset of relatively high θ points ˜ Θ ⊂ Θi such that E{˜ Θ} >
E{θ|θ ∈ Θi} − φ, and E{Θi/˜ Θ} > φ. Then we can remove the remove the points ˜ Θ from Θi
19and put them in their own partition. This will not lower v0i, and we can construct v1(θ) so
that it is weakly higher on Θi, while we can set the v0 and v1 strictly higher for θ ∈ ˜ Θ. This
means that the same monitoring and managerial consumption choices are still feasible, while
it relaxes the our incentive and no-perks constraints. Hence, we can lower π for θ ∈ ˜ Θ which
raises the value of the objective. Note that Case 1 applies to the case in which Pr{Θi} > 0.
Case 2: The set Θi is not of positive measure and there does not exist an appropriate
subset ˜ Θ to break oﬀ. In this case, one can achieve the same result by simply having the
manager randomize in his reports. For example assume that Θi = {θ1,θ2}, where θ2 > θ1.
T h e nb yc h o o s i n gap r o b a b i l i t yκ of reporting partition i, where
κp(θ2)θ2 + p(θ1)θ1
κp(θ2)+p(θ1)
− φ > θ1,
t h es a m ec h o i c eo fv0i is still feasible, and v1(πi,θ) can be raised. Furthermore, for the report
that is made with probability 1−κ,v 1 = θ2 and v0 = θ2 −φ. This relaxes that no-perks and
incentive constraints for this alternative report, allowing for a lower monitoring probability.
To prove the second statement, assume that φ > γ and consider lowering it γ. So
long as E{θ|θ ∈ Θi} − γ ≤ min(θ ∈ Θi), this will lead to a raising of v0i, which relaxes
the incentive and no-perks constraints. If this the reverse inequality is true, then we can
construct eﬃciency improving sub-divisions of our current partition along the lines discussed
above. Q.E.D.
E. Eﬃcient Partition Size
Assume that the partitions are intervals of the form
Θi =[ a−i,a i],
where a0 =0and aI+1 = 1, and the vector of a = {a1,...,aI} (where ai >a i−1) deﬁnes the
partitions. Then assume that the partitions are suﬃciently small that E{θ|Θi} − γ <a −i,
so we can set v1(θ,i)=θ and v0i = E{θ|Θi} − γ. Also, conjecture that U is suﬃciently high
that the no-perks constraints do not bind (something which we can verify once we have the
solution). As was noted above, this implies that x0(θ,i)=x1(θ,i). G i v e nt h i s ,w ec a nw r i t e
20the Lagrangean in terms of the utility of the agent, y(θ,i), as we did in the commitment case.






















[y(θ,i) − (1 − πj)u(τ(θ − E {θ|θ ∈ [aj−1,a j]} + γ))]δ(θ,j,i)p(θ)dθ.








u(τ(θ − E {θ|θ ∈ [ai−1,a i]} + γ))δ(θ,i,j)p(θ)dθ =0
The f.o.c. for y(θ,i) can be written as
−C




And, the f.o.c. for ai c a nb ew r i t t e na s
{[−γπi − C(y(ai,i))] − [−γπi+1 − C(y(ai,i+ 1))]}p(ai)







[y(ai,i) − (1 − πj)u(τ(ai − E {θ|θ ∈ [aj−1,a j]} + γ))]δ(θ,j,i)












0(τ(θ − E {θ|θ ∈ [ai−1,a i]} + γ))











0(τ(θ − E {θ|θ ∈ [ai,a i+1]} + γ))





If the partitions are small, then the incentive constraints cannot bind locally: for
θ ∈ [ai,a i+1] if ai+1 is close enough to a−i, then since τ(θ − a−i) <C 0−1(λ), and the con-
straint doesn’t bind with respect to the next lower partition. But, this implies that changing










0(τ(θ − E {θ|θ ∈ [ai−1,a i]} + γ))











0(τ(θ − E {θ|θ ∈ [ai,a i+1]} + γ))





The monitoring probabilities will be declining in i, hence the ﬁrst term is negative. But,




dE {θ|θ ∈ [ai,a i+1]}
dai
> 0.
What is happening at the margin is that the ﬁrst-order condition is trading oﬀ the increases
probability of monitoring from expanding partition Θi at the expense of Θi+1 against the
increase in v0i and v0i+1 that this leads too.
4. Numerical Example
Consider the following example: The set of sets Θ =[ 0 ,0.1,0.2,...,2] and each state is
equally likely. τ = .5, γ =0 .1, and preferences are u(c)=
√
c, which implies that C(u)=u2.
We set the reservation utility U =
√
.2, which was high enough so that the no-perks condition
did not bind in either commitment and self-enforcing stochastic monitoring problems. We ﬁnd
that stochastic monitoring with commitment yielded a 5.87% higher solution value relative to
deterministic monitoring. We also ﬁnd that at the optimal partition, self-enforcing monitoring
yielded 5.57% higher solution value than deterministic monitoring, and for this solution the
associated partition was nonminimal. We report the monitoring probabilities and the wage
payments to the manager below for each of our solutions. What one see’s is that base wages
22are lower with deterministic monitoring than with self-enforcing monitoring, which in turn
has lower base wages that stochastic monitoring with commitment. Correspondingly, the
solutions with lower base wages had higher wages for high levels of θ, when the incentive
conditions bound. In the stochastic monitoring cases - both with commitment and self-
enforcement - monitoring probabilities are always below 1/2, and monitoring is used over a
wider range of states than in the deterministic case.
Deterministic Monitoring: The solution in terms of monitoring probabilities (m) and the
manager’s payment (w) is given by
θ m w θ m w
0 1 .160 1.1 1 .160
.1 1 .160 1.2 0 .160
..2 1 .160 1.3 0 .160
.3 1 .160 1.4 0 .160
.4 1 .160 1.5 0 .200
.5 1 .160 1.6 0 .250
.6 1 .160 1.7 0 .300
.7 1 .160 1.8 0 .350
.8 1 .160 1.9 0 .400
.9 1 .160 2.0 0 .450
1.0 1 .160
Stochastic Monitoring with Commitment: The value of the solution probabilities of monitor-
23ing (m)a n dt h ep a y m e n t( w) are given in the following table.
θ m w θ m w
0 .450 .165 1.1 .112 .168
.1 .429 .165 1.2 .058 .181
..2 .408 .165 1.3 0 .197
.3 .385 .165 1.4 0 .212
.4 .360 .165 1.5 0 .228
.5 .334 .165 1.6 0 .246
.6 .305 .165 1.7 0 .266
.7 .274 .165 1.8 0 .290
.8 .238 .165 1.9 0 .319
.9 .201 .165 2.0 0 .355
1.0 .158 .165









and the monitoring probabilities, wages, and the nonmonitoring payment v0 were given
24by
θ m w v0 θ m w v0
0 .445 .162 0 1.1 .155 .170 1.0
.1 .445 .162 0 1.2 .110 .185 1.1
..2 .445 .162 0 1.3 .056 .200 1.2
.3 .379 .162 0.3 1.4 0 .216 1.3
.4 .379 .162 0.3 1.5 0 .231 1.4
.5 .379 .162 0.3 1.6 0 .250 1.5
.6 .315 .162 0.55 1.7 0 .270 1.6
.7 .315 .162 0.55 1.8 0 .293 1.7
.8 .253 .163 0.75 1.9 0 .321 1.8
.9 .253 .163 0.75 2.0 0 .357 1.9
1.0 .199 .164 0.9
25